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Abstract
While deep neural networks have been achieving state-
of-the-art performance across a wide variety of appli-
cations, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks limits
their widespread deployment for safety-critical applica-
tions. Alongside other adversarial defense approaches
being investigated, there has been a very recent interest
in improving adversarial robustness in deep neural net-
works through the introduction of perturbations during the
training process. However, such methods leverage fixed,
pre-defined perturbations and require significant hyper-
parameter tuning that makes them very difficult to lever-
age in a general fashion. In this study, we introduce
Learn2Perturb, an end-to-end feature perturbation learn-
ing approach for improving the adversarial robustness of
deep neural networks. More specifically, we introduce
novel perturbation-injection modules that are incorporated
at each layer to perturb the feature space and increase
uncertainty in the network. This feature perturbation is
performed at both the training and the inference stages.
Furthermore, inspired by the Expectation-Maximization, an
alternating back-propagation training algorithm is intro-
duced to train the network and noise parameters consec-
utively. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets show that the proposed Learn2Perturb method can
result in deep neural networks which are 4-7% more robust
on l∞ FGSMand PDG adversarial attacks and significantly
outperforms the state-of-the-art against l2 C&W attack and
a wide range of well-known black-box attacks.
1. Introduction
The vulnerability of DNN models to adversarial exam-
ples have raised major concerns [1, 7, 9, 25, 31] on their
large-scale adaption in a wide variety of applications.
Adversarial attacks can be divided into two categories of
black-box and white-box attacks based on the level of in-
formation available to the attacker. Black-box attacks usu-
ally perform queries on the model, and they have partial
information regarding the data and the structure of the tar-
geted model [16, 28]. On the other hand, white-box attacks
have a better understanding of the model that they attack
to; therefore, they are more powerful than black-box at-
tacks [14, 34]. This understanding might vary between dif-
ferent white-box attack algorithms; nonetheless, gradients
of the model’s loss function with respect to the input data is
the most common information utilized to modify input sam-
ples and generate adversarial examples. First-order white-
box adversaries are the most common attacking algorithms
which only use the first order of gradients [6, 24, 25, 34] to
craft the adversarial perturbation.
In the realm of defense mechanisms, approaches like dis-
tillation [26, 29], feature denoising [35], and adversarial
training [11, 24] have been proposed to resolve the vulnera-
bility of DNNs on adversarial attacks. Adversarial training
is considered as a very intuitive yet very promising solution
to improve the robustness of DNN models against adversar-
ial attacks.
Madry et al. [24] illustrated that adversarial learning
using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) for generating
on-the-fly adversarial samples during training can lead to
trained models which provide robustness guarantees against
all first-order adversaries. They experimentally showed that
the adversarial examples in a l∞ ball distance around the
original sample with many random starts in the ball gener-
ated with PGD, all have approximately the same loss value
when are fed to the network as input. Due to this fact, they
provide the guarantee that as long as the attack algorithm is
a first-order adversary, the local maximas of the loss value
would not be significantly better than those found by PGD.
Applying regularization techniques is another approach
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to train more robust network models [5]. To do so, ei-
ther new loss functions were proposed with added or em-
bedded regularization terms (i.e., adversarial generaliza-
tion) [10, 15, 33] or the network was augmented with new
modules [14, 20, 21, 22] for regularization purposesmaking
the network more robust at the end.
Randomization approaches and specifically random
noise injection [14, 21, 22] has been recently proposed as
one of the network augmentation methods to address the
adversarial robustness in deep neural networks. A random
noise generator as an extra module is embedded in the net-
work architecture adding random noise to the input or the
output of layers. Although the noise distribution usually fol-
lows a Gaussian distribution for its simplicity, it is possible
to use different noise distributions. This noise augmentation
technique adds more uncertainty in the network and makes
the adversarial attack optimization harder which improves
the robustness of the model.
While the noise injection technique has shown promis-
ing results, determining the parameters of the distribution
and how to add the noise values to the network are still
challenging. The majority of the methods proposed in lit-
erature [20, 21, 22, 37] manually select the parameters of
the distribution. However, He et al. [14] recently proposed
a new algorithm in which the noise distributions are learned
in the training step. Their proposed Parametric Noise In-
jection (PNI) technique injects trainable noise to the activa-
tions or the weights of the CNN model. The problem asso-
ciated to the proposed PNI technique is that the noise pa-
rameters tend to converge to zero as the training progresses,
making the noise injection progressively less effective over
time. This problem is partially compensated through the uti-
lization of PGD adversarial training as suggested by Madry
et al. [24], but the decreasing trend of noise parameter mag-
nitudes still remains, and thus, limits the overall effect of
the PNI.
In this paper, the Learn2Perturb framework, an end-to-
end feature perturbation learning approach is proposed to
improve the robustness of DNN models. An alternating
back-propagation strategy is introduced where the follow-
ing two steps are performed in an alternating manner: i)
the network parameters are updated in the presence of fea-
ture perturbation injection to improve adversarial robust-
ness, and ii) the parameters of the perturbation injection
modules are updated to strengthen perturbation capabilities
against the improved network. Decoupling these two steps
helps both sets of parameters (i.e., network parameters and
perturbation injection modules) to be trained to their full
functionalities and produces a more robust network. To this
end, our contributions can be folded as below:
• A highly efficient and stable end-to-end learning
mechanism is introduced to learn the perturbation-
injection modules to improve the model robustness
against adversarial attacks. The proposed alternat-
ing back-propagationmethod inspired by Expectation-
Maximization (EM) concept trains the network and
noise parameters in a consecutive way gradually with-
out any significant parameter-tuning effort.
• A new effective regularizer is introduced to help
the network learning process which smoothly im-
proves the noise distributions. Combining this reg-
ularizer and PGD-adversarial training helps the pro-
posed Learn2Perturb algorithm achieve the state-of-
the-art performances.
• Exhaustive experiments are conducted for vari-
ous white-box and black-box adversarial attacks on
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, and new state-of-
the-art performances are reported for these algorithms.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a
discussion of related work in terms of different adversarial
attacks; the proposed Learn2Perturb approach is presented
in Section 3 and experimental results and discussion are pre-
sented in Section 4 followed by a conclusion.
2. Related Work
The gradients of the loss function with respect to the in-
put data are very common information used by adversarial
attack algorithms. In this type of approaches, the proposed
algorithms try to maximize the loss value of the network by
crafting the minimum perturbations into input data.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [34] is the sim-
plest yet a very efficient white-box attack. For a DNN
parametrized with W (i.e., where the network is encoded
as fW (x)) and loss function L, for any input x, the FGSM
attack computes the adversarial example x′ as:
x′ = x+ ǫ · sign
(
∇xL
(
fW (x), x
))
(1)
where ǫ determines the attack strength and sign(·) returns
the sign tensor for a given tensor. Using this gradient ascent
step, FGSM tries to locally maximize the loss function L.
The FGSM approach is extended by projected gradient
descent (PGD) [19, 24] where for a number of k iterations,
PGD produces xt+1 = boundlp(FGSM(xt), x0), in which
x0 is the original input and 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1. Using projec-
tion, the boundlp(x
′, x) simply ensures that x′ is within a
specified lp range of the original input x.
Madry et al. [24] illustrated that different PGD attack
restarts, each with a random initialization for input within
the l∞–ball around x, find different local maximas with
very similar loss values. Based on this finding, they claimed
that PGD is a universal first-order adversary.
C&W attack [6] is another strong first-order attack algo-
rithm which finds perturbation δ added to input x by solving
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the optimization problem formulated as:
min
[
||δ||p + c · f(x+ δ)
]
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
where p shows the norm distance. While p can be any ar-
bitrary number, C&W is most effective when p = 2; as
such, here, we only consider l2-norm for C&W evaluations.
Moreover, f(·) encodes the objective function driving the
perturbed sample to be misclassified (ideally f(·) ≤ 0), and
c is a constant balancing the two terms involved in 2. It is
worth noting that, all the white-box attacks explained here
(i.e. FGSM, PGD, and C&W) are first-order adversaries.
Black-box attacks can only access a model via queries;
sending inputs and receiving corresponding outputs to esti-
mate the inner working of the network. To fool a network,
the well-known black-box attacks either use surrogate net-
works [16, 28] or estimate the gradients [8, 32] via multiple
queries to the targeted network.
In the surrogate network approach, a new network mim-
icking the behavior of the target model [28] is trained. At-
tackers perform queries on the target model and generate a
synthetic dataset with the query inputs and associated out-
puts. Having this dataset, a surrogate network is trained.
Recent works [23, 28] showed that adversarial examples
fooling the surrogate model can also fool the target model
with a high success rate. A simple variant of the surro-
gate model attack, Transferability adversarial attacks [27],
is when the surrogate model has access to the same train-
ing data as the interested network. Adversarial examples
fooling the substituted network usually transfer to (fool) the
target model as well. Since substitute networks may not al-
ways be successful [8, 16], black-box gradient estimation
attacks only deal with the target model itself. Zeroth order
optimization (ZOO) [8] and attacks alternating only a few
pixels [32] approaches are examples of this kind of black-
box attack, to name a few.
3. Methodology
In this work, we propose a new framework called
Learn2Perturb for improving the adversarial robustness of
a deep neural network through end-to-end feature perturba-
tion learning. Although it has been illustrated both theoret-
ically and practically [2, 30] that randomization techniques
can improve the robustness of deep neural networks1, there
is still not an effective way to select the distribution of the
noise in the neural networks. In Learn2Perturb, trainable
perturbation-injection modules are integrated into a deep
neural network with the goal of injecting customized per-
turbations into the feature space at different parts of the
network to increase the uncertainty of its inner workings
1Theoretical background on the effect of randomization algorithm to
improve the robustness of a deep neural network model is discussed in the
supplementary material.
within an optimal manner. We formulate the joint problem
of learning the model parameters and the perturbation distri-
butions of the perturbation-injection modules in an end-to-
end learning framework via an alternating back-propagation
approach [12]. As shown in Figure 1, the proposed alternat-
ing back-propagation strategy for the joint learning of the
network parameters and the perturbation-injection modules
is inspired from the EM technique; and it comprises of two
key alternating steps: i) Perturbation-injected network
training: the network parameters are trained by gradient
descent while the proposed perturbation-injection modules
add layer-wise noise to the feature maps (different locations
in the network). Noise injection parameters are fixed dur-
ing this step. ii) Perturbation-injection module training:
the parameters of the perturbation-injectionmodules are up-
dated via gradient descent and based on the regularization
term added to the network loss function, while network pa-
rameters are fixed.
The effect of using such a training strategy is that in step
(i), the model minimizes the loss function of the classifi-
cation problem when noise is being injected into multiple
layers, and the model learns how to classify despite the in-
jected perturbations. And in step (ii), the noise parameters
are updated with a combination of network gradients and
the regularization term applied to these parameters. The
goal of this step is to let the network react to the noise in-
jections via gradient descent and pose a bigger challenge
to the network via a smooth increase of noise based on the
regularizer. The trained perturbation-injectionmodules per-
turb the feature layers of the model in the inference phase
as well.
3.1. Perturbation-Injection Distribution
Given the observable variablesX ,W as the input and the
set of weights in the neural network, respectively, the goal
is to model the neural network as a probabilistic model such
that the output of the model, Y , is drawn from a distribution
rather than a deterministic function. A probabilistic output
is more robust against adversarial perturbation. As such, Y
can be formulated as:
Y ∼ P (X ;W, θ) (3)
where W and θ show the set of network and noise param-
eters, respectively, and X is the input fed into the network.
The output Y is drawn from a distribution driven from W
and the set of independent parameters, θ.
For a given layer l of the neural network, the
perturbation-injection modules can be used to achieve the
following probability model for the layer’s final activations:
Pl(Xl;Wl, θl) = fl(Xl,Wl) +Q(θl) (4)
where fl(Xl,Wl) represents the activation of layer l with
weights Wl, Xl as its input, and Q(θl) is a noise distribu-
3
Figure 1. Overview of Learn2Perturb: During training, an alternating back-propagation strategy is introduced where the following two
steps are performed in an alternating manner: i) the network parameters are updated in the presence of feature perturbation injection
to improve adversarial robustness, and ii) the parameters of the perturbation injection modules are updated to strengthen perturbation
capabilities against improved network. The learned perturbation injection modules can be added to some or all tensors in the network
to inject perturbations in feature space for two-prong adversarial robustness: i) improve robustness during training when training under
perturbation injection, and ii) increase network uncertainty through interference-time perturbation injection to make it difficult to learn an
adversarial attack.
tion with parameters θl following an exponential distribu-
tion function. While Q(·) can be any exponential distribu-
tion, we choose Gaussian distribution because of its sim-
plicity to model and effectiveness, which can be formulated
as follow:
Q(θl) = θl · N (0, 1). (5)
The parameter θl scales the magnitude of the output from
the normal distribution encoding the standard deviation of
the distribution Q(·). Substituting the right hand-side of
Q(·) defined in (5) into (4) enforces Pl(·) to follow a Gaus-
sian distribution:
Pl(Xl;Wl, θl) ≈ N
(
fl(Xl,Wl), θl
)
. (6)
This new probabilistic formulation of layer activa-
tions can be extended to the whole network, so in-
stead of a deterministic output Y , network outputs
P (X ;W, θ) ≈ N
(
f(X,W ), θ
)
, with W and θ showing
the parameters of all layers.
Having this new formulation for a deep neural network,
a proper training process to effectively learn both sets of
these parameters is highly desired. To this end, we propose
a new training mechanism to learn both network parameters
and perturbation-injection modules in an alternating back-
propagation approach.
3.2. Alternating Back-Propagation
The proposed neural network structure comprises of two
sets of parameters, W and θ, being trained given training
samples (X,T ) as the input and the ground truth output to
the network. However, these two sets of parameters are in
conflict with each other and try to push the learning process
in two opposite directions. Having the probabilistic repre-
sentationP (·),W is mapping the inputX to output T based
on the mean of the distribution P (·), f(X,W ); while, the
set of θ improves the generalization of the model by includ-
ing perturbations into the training mechanism.
The proposed alternating back-propagation framework
decouples the learning process associated to network pa-
rametersW and perturbation-injection distributions θ to ef-
fectively update both sets of parameters. To this end, the
network parameters and perturbation-injection modules are
updated in a consecutive manner.
The training process of the proposed Learn2Perturb is
done within two main steps:
• Perturbation-injected network training; the parameters
of the network, W , are updated via gradient descent
to decrease the network loss in the presence of per-
turbations, caused by the currently fixed perturbation-
injection distribution,Q|θ.
• Perturbation-injection distribution training; the pa-
rameters of the perturbation-injection distribution, θ,
are updated given the set of parameters W are fixed
to improve the generalization of the network and as a
result, improve its robustness against adversarial per-
turbation.
These two steps are performed consecutively; however, the
number of iterations for each step before moving to the next
step can be determined based on the application.
Utilizing a generic loss function in the training of the
network when the perturbation-injection modules are em-
bedded forces the noise parameters to converge to zero and
eventually removes the effect of the perturbation-injection
distributions by making them very small. In other words,
the neural network with generic loss tends to learn P (·) as
a Dirac distribution where the Q(·) is close to zero; to pre-
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Algorithm 1: Alternating back-propagation of the
Learn2Perturb framework
Input : Training set D =
{(xi, ti), i = 1, . . . , n}
Number of training epochs, I
θmin, the lower bound for θ
θ0, initial values for θ
Learning rate, lr, and constant γ
Output : Learned parametersW
Learned noise distributionsQ(θ)
for t← 1 to I do
Perturbation-injected training: updateW based
on the loss function L(·) Eq. (7) while θ is fixed
W t ←W t−1− lr ·∇WL
(
P (X ;W t−1, θt−1), T
)
Perturbation-injection module training:
update θ based on Eq. (7) whileW is fixed
θt ← θt−1 − lr · ∇θL
(
P (X ;W t−1, θt−1), T
)
−
γ · ∇θg(θ
t−1)
Values of θt smaller than θmin are projected to
θmin
end
vent the aforementioned problem, a new regularization term
is designed and added to the loss function. As such the new
loss function can be formulated as:
arg min
W,θ
[
L
(
P (X ;W, θ), T
)
+ γ · g(θ)
]
(7)
where L(·) is the classification loss function (i.e., usually
cross entropy) such that the set of parametersW need to be
tuned to generate the associated output of the inputX . The
function g(θ) is the regularizer enforcing smooth increase
in the parameters θ = {θl,j}l=1:Kj=1:Ml , where θl,j shows the
jth noise parameter in the lth layer, corresponding to an el-
ement of the output feature map. K and Ml represent the
number of layers and noise parameters per layer, respec-
tively. γ is the hyper-parameter balancing the two terms in
the optimization. Independent distributions are learnt for
perturbation-injectionmodels in each layer. The regularizer
function should be enforced with an annealing characteris-
tic where the perturbation-injection distributions are grad-
ually improved and converged thus the parameters W can
be trained effectively. As such the regularization function is
formulated as below:
g(θ) = −
θ1/2
τ
(8)
where τ is the output of a harmonic series given the cur-
rent epoch value in the training process. Using a harmonic
series to determine τ , gradually decreases the effect of the
reqularizer function in the loss and lets the neural network
converge. While the squared root of θ makes the equation
easier to take the derivative, it also provides a slower rate
of change for larger values of θ which helps the network to
converge to a steady state smoothly.
As seen in Algorithm 1 at first, the perturbation-injection
distributions Q and network parameters W are initialized.
Then the model parameters W are updated based on the
classification loss L(·), and this loss function is minimized
in the presence of perturbation-injectionmodules. Then, the
perturbation-injection distributions Q are updated by per-
forming the “perturbation-injection module training” step.
One of the main advantages of this approach is that since
the learning process of these two sets of parameters is de-
coupled, the training process can be easily performed with-
out a large amount of manual hyper-parameter tweaking
compared to other randomized state-of-the-art approaches.
Moreover, the proposed method can help the model to con-
verge faster as the perturbation-injection distributions are
continuously improved during the training process.
3.3. Model Setup, Training and Inference
Perturbation-injection distributions are added to the net-
work in different locations and specifically after each con-
volution operation to create a new network model based
on the Learn2Perturb framework. As shown in Figure 1,
these modules generate the perturbations with the same size
as the feature activation maps of that specific layer. Each
perturbation-injection distribution follows independent dis-
tribution and therefore, the generated perturbation value for
each feature is drawn independently.
In the training phase, the model parameters and the
perturbation-injection distributions are trained in an itera-
tive and consecutive manner and based on the proposed al-
ternating back-propagation approach. It is worth to men-
tion that the model parameters are trained for 20 epochs be-
fore activating the perturbation distributions to help the net-
work parameters converge to a good initial point. After 20
epochs, the alternating back-propagation is applied to train
both model parameters and perturbation-injection distribu-
tions. Furthermore, we take advantage of adversarial train-
ing technique which adds on-the-fly adversarial examples
into the training data, to improve the model’s robustness
more effectively against perturbations. As such PGD adver-
sarial technique is incorporated in the training to provide
stronger guarantee bounds against all first-order adversaries
optimizing in l∞ space.
The perturbation-injection distributions are applied in
the inference step, as well. This will introduce a dynamic
nature into the inference process and as a result, it makes
it harder for the adversaries to find an optimal adversarial
examples to fool the network.
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4. Experiments
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
Learn2Perturb, we train various models using this
framework and evaluate their robustness against different
adversarial attack algorithms. Furthermore, the proposed
method is compared with different state-of-the-art ap-
proaches including PGD adversarial training [24] (also
denoted as Vanilla model), Parametric Noise Injection
(PNI) [14], Adversarial Bayesian Neural Network (Adv-
BNN) [22], Random Self-Ensemble (RSE) [21] and
PixelDP (DP) [20].
4.1. Dataset & Adversarial Attacks
For the evaluation purpose, the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 datasets2 [18] are utilized for training and evaluating
the networks. Both of these datasets contain 50,000 training
data and 10,000 test data of natural color images of 32× 32;
however, CIFAR-10 has 10 different class with 6000 im-
ages per class, while CIFAR-100 has 100 classes with 600
images per class.
Different white-box and black-box attacks are utilized
to evaluate the proposed Learn2Perturb along with state-of-
the-art methods. The competing algorithms are evaluated
via white-box attacks including FGSM [34], PGD [19] and
C&W attacks [6]. One-Pixel attack [32], and Transferabil-
ity attack [27] are utilized as the black-box attacks to eval-
uate the competing method.
4.2. Experimental Setup
We use ResNet based architectures [13] as the baseline
for our experiments; The classical ResNet architecture (i.e.,
ResNet-V1 and its variations) and the new ResNet archi-
tecture (i.e., ResNet-V2) are used for evaluation. The main
difference between two architectures is the number of stages
and the number of blocks in each stage. Moreover, aver-
age pooling is utilized for down-sampling in ResNet-V1
architecture while the ResNet-V2 uses 1 × 1 CNN layers
for this purpose. Followed by the experimental setup pro-
posed in [14], data normalization is done via adding a non-
trainable layer at the beginning of the network and the ad-
versarial perturbations are directly added to the original in-
put data, before normalization being applied. Both adver-
sarial training and robustness testing setup follow the same
configurations as introduced in [24] and [14]. Adversarial
training with PGD and testing robustness against PGD, are
both done in 7 iterations with the maximum l∞ = 8/255
(i.e., ǫ) and step sizes of 0.01 for each iteration. FGSM at-
tack also uses the same 8/255 limit for perturbation. For
C&W attack, we use ADAM [17] optimizer with learning
rate 5e−4. Maximum number of iterations is 1000, and for
the constant c in 2 we choose the range 1e−3 to 1e10; fur-
thermore to find the value of c, binary search with up to 9
2Experimental results for CIFAR-100 dataset are reported in the sup-
plementary material.
steps is performed. The confidence, κ, parameter of C&W
attack, which turns out to have a big effect while evaluating
defense approaches involving randomization, takes values
ranging from 0 to 5.
In the case of transferability attacks, a PGD adversari-
ally trained network (i.e. a vanilla model) is used as the
source network for generating adversarial examples and
these adversarial samples are then utilized to attack com-
peting models. For one/few-pixel attacks, we consider the
case {1, 2, 3}-pixel attack in this work. 3
4.3. Experimental Results
To evaluate the proposed Learn2Perturb framework, the
method is compared with PGD adversarial trained model
(also denoted as Vanilla). The proposed module is evalu-
ated on three different ResNet architectures. Table 1 shows
the effectiveness of the proposed Learn2Perturb method in
improving the robustness of different networks architec-
tures. Results demonstrate that the proposed perturbation-
injection modules improve the network’s robustness. As
seen, the proposed perturbation-injection modules can pro-
vide robust performance on both ‘ResNet-V1’ (both with
20 and 56 layers) and ‘ResNet-V2’ (18 layers) architectures
against both FGSM and PGD attacks which illustrates the
effectiveness of the proposed module in providing more ro-
bust network architectures. Furthermore, the evaluation re-
sults for no defense approach (a network without any im-
provement) are provided as a reference point.
We also evaluate a variation of the proposed
Learn2Perturb framework (i.e. Learn2Perturb-R) where
we analyze a different approach in performing the two
steps of “perturbation-injected network training” and
“perturbation-injection module training”. In this variation,
the perturbation-injection modules are only updated using
the regularizer function g(θ), and network gradients are not
used to update θ parameters.
As it can be seen in table 1, taking advantage of both
network gradient and the regularizer performs better than
when we only take into account the regulizer effect. One
reason to justify this outcome is allowing the gradient of
loss function L(·) to update perturbation-injection modules
in Learn2Perturb. This would let the loss function to react
to perturbationswhen they cannot tolerate the injected noise
and updates the perturbation-injection noise modules more
frequently. Nonetheless, the results in table 1 show that
Learn2Perturb-R still outperforms other proposed methods
in adversarial robustness, though it suffers from smaller
clean data accuracy.
4.4. Robustness Comparison
In this section, to further illustrate the effectiveness
of the proposed Learn2Perturb framework, we compare
3A more detailed experimental setup is provided in the supplementary
material.
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Table 1. Evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed perturbation-injection modules by comparing against adversarial training algorithm
(Vanilla) within the proposed framework and its variation (Learn2Perturb-R).
No defense Vanilla[24] Learn2Perturb-R Learn2Perturb
Model #Parameter Clean PGD FGSM Clean PGD FGSM Clean PGD FGSM Clean PGD FGSM
ResNet-V1(20) 269,722 92.1 0.0±0.0 14.1 83.8 39.1±0.1 46.6 81.15±0.02 50.23±0.14 55.89±0.04 83.62±0.02 51.13±0.08 58.41±0.07
ResNet-V1(56) 853,018 93.3 0.0±0.0 24.2 86.5 40.1±0.1 48.8 82.35±0.03 53.30±0.10 58.71±0.04 84.82±0.04 54.84±0.10 61.53±0.04
ResNet-V2(18) 11,173,962 95.2 0.1±0.0 43.1 85.46 43.9±0.0 52.5 82.46±0.17 53.33±0.12 59.09±0.17 85.30±0.09 56.06±0.16 62.43±0.06
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Figure 2. Analyzing the effectiveness of the proposed method
compared to state-of-the-art algorithms on different ǫ values for
FGSM attack.
Learn2Perturb with PNI [14] and Adv-BNN [22] as two
randomization state-of-the-art approaches to improve the
robustness of deep neural networks. Table 2 reports these
comparison results for different network architectures vary-
ing in network depth and capacity. We examine the ef-
fect of different network depths including ResNet-V1(20),
ResNet-V1(32), ResNet-V1(44) and ResNet-V1(56) along
with the effect of network width in Table 2 by increas-
ing the number of filters in ResNet-V1(20) which results
to ResNet-V1(20)[1.5×], ResNet-V1(20)[2×] and ResNet-
V1(20)[4×]. As seen, while the competing methods do not
provide consistent performance by increasing the capacity
of the network (increasing depth or width) the proposed
framework provides consistent robustness through different
network capacities.
The reported results in Table 2 show that while PNI pro-
vides minor boosting in network accuracy on clean data,
the proposed Learn2Perturb method performs with much
higher accuracy when the input data is perturbed with ad-
versarial noise. The main reason for this phenomena is the
fact that PNI reach to a very low level of the noise per-
turbation during the training as the loss function tries to
remove the effect of perturbation by making the noise pa-
rameters to zero. The results demonstrate that the proposed
Learn2Perturb algorithm outperforms the PNI method by
4-7% on both FGSM and PGD adversarial attacks. The
proposed method is also compared with Adv-BNN [22].
Results show that while Adv-BNN can provide robust net-
works in some cases compared to PNI, it is not scalable
when the network width is increased and the performance
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Figure 3. Evaluating the robustness of the proposed Learn2Perturb
compared with other state-of-the-art methods through different ǫ
based on PGD attack.
of the networks drop drastically. This is illustrated one of
the drawbacks of Bayesian approach which they need to be
designed carefully for each network architecture separately.
It has been shown, there is no guarantee that methods
robust against l∞ attacks would provide same level of ro-
bustness against l2 attacks [2]. Araujo et al. [2] illustrated
experimentally that randomization technique trained with
l∞ can improve the robustness against l2 attacks as well.
In this work we further validate this finding. In order to
provide more powerful l2 attacks challenging the effect of
randomization, we apply C&W attacks with different con-
fidence values, κ. The parameter κ enforces the f(·) in 2
to be ≤ −κ rather than simply ≤ 0. As seen in Table 3,
for bigger values of κ the success rate of C&W attack in-
creases; nonetheless, our proposed method outperforms the
other competing methods with a big margin for all values
of κ.
Table 4 shows the comparison results for the proposed
method and state-of-the-art approaches in providing ro-
bust network model on CIFAR-10 dataset. The pro-
posed Learn2Perturb method outperforms other state-the-
art methods and provides a more robust network model with
better performance when dealing with PGD attack.
We also analyze the effectiveness of the proposed
method in dealing with different adversarial noise levels.
To this end, the ResNet-V2(18) architecture is utilized for
all competing methods. The network architectures are de-
signed and trained via four different competing methods;
and the trained networks are examinedwith both FGSM and
PGD attacks but with a variation of ǫ values.
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Table 2. The effect of network capacity on the performance of the proposed method and other state-of-the-art algorithms. The proposed
Learn2Perturb is compared with Parametric Noise Injection (PNI) method [14] and Adv-BNN [22]. Results shows the effectiveness of the
proposed Learn2Perturb algorithm in training robust neural network models. To have a fair comparison, we evaluated methods on different
network sizes and capacities. Result are reported by standard deviation because of the randomness involved in these methods.
PNI [14] Adv-BNN [22] Learn2Perturb
Model #Parameter Clean PGD FGSM Clean PGD FGSM Clean PGD FGSM
ResNet-V1(20) 269,722 84.90±0.1 45.90±0.1 54.50±0.4 65.76±5.92 44.95±1.21 51.58±1.49 83.62±0.02 51.13±0.08 58.41±0.07
ResNet-V1(32) 464,154 85.90±0.1 43.50±0.3 51.50±0.1 62.95±5.63 54.62±0.06 50.29±2.70 84.19±0.06 54.62±0.06 59.94±0.11
ResNet-V1(44) 658,586 84.70±0.2 48.50±0.2 55.80±0.1 76.87±0.24 54.62±0.06 58.55±0.49 85.61±0.01 54.62±0.06 61.32±0.13
ResNet-V1(56) 853,018 86.80±0.2 46.30±0.3 53.90±0.1 77.20±0.02 54.62±0.06 57.88±0.02 84.82±0.04 54.62±0.06 61.53±0.04
ResNet-V1(20)[1.5×] 605,026 86.00±0.1 46.70±0.2 54.50±0.2 65.58±0.42 28.07±1.11 36.11±1.29 85.40±0.08 53.32±0.02 61.10±0.06
ResNet-V1(20)[2×] 1,073,962 86.20±0.1 46.10±0.2 54.60±0.2 79.03±0.04 53.46±0.06 58.30±0.14 85.89±0.10 54.29±0.02 61.61±0.05
ResNet-V1(20)[4×] 4,286,026 87.70±0.1 49.10±0.3 57.00±0.2 82.31±0.03 52.61±0.12 59.01±0.04 86.09±0.05 55.75±0.07 61.32±0.02
ResNet-V2(18) 11,173,962 87.21±0.00 49.42±0.01 58.06±0.02 82.15±0.06 53.62±0.06 60.04±0.01 85.30±0.09 56.06±0.08 62.43±0.06
Table 3. Comparison results of the proposed Learn2Perturb and
competing methods on C&W [6] attack.
Confidence No defense Vanilla PNI Adv-BNN Learn2Perturb
κ = 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.9 78.9 83.6
κ = 0.1 0.0 0.0 66.1 78.1 84.0
κ = 1.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 65.1 76.4
κ = 2.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 49.1 66.5
κ = 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 16.0 34.8
Table 4. Comparison results of the proposed Learn2Perturb and
state-of-the-art methods in providing a robust network model.
Some of the numbers are extracted from [14]. The reported re-
sults are either based on the maximum accuracy achieved in the
literature or own results if we achieved higher level of accuracy.
Defense Method Model Clean PGD
RSE [21] ResNext 87.5 40
DP [20] 28-10 wide ResNet 87 25
Adv-BNN [22] ResNet-V1(56) 77.20 54.62±0.06
PGD adv. training [24] ResNet-V1(20) [4×] 87 46.1±0.1
PNI [14] ResNet-V1(20) [4×] 87.7±0.1 49.1±0.3
Learn2Perturb ResNet-V2(18) 85.3±0.1 56.3±0.1
Figure 2 demonstrates the robustness of four competing
methods in dealing with FGSM adversarial attack. As seen,
while increasing ǫ decreases the robustness of all trained
networks, the network designed and trained by the pro-
posed Learn2Perturb approach outperforms other methods
through all variations of adversarial noise values (ǫ’s).
To confirm the results shown in Figure 2, the same ex-
periment is conducted to examine the robustness of the
trained networks on PGD attack. While the PGD attack
is more powerful in fooling the networks, results show
that the network designed and trained by the proposed
Learn2Perturb framework still outperforms other state-of-
the-art approaches.
4.5. Expectation over Transformation (EOT)
Athalye et. al [3] showed that many of the defense algo-
rithms that take advantage of injecting randomization to net-
work interior layers or applying random transformations on
the input before feeding it to the network achieve robustness
through false stochastic gradients. They further stated that
these methods obfuscate the gradients that attackers utilize
to perform iterative attacking optimizations. As such, they
proposed the EOT attack (originally introduced in [4]) to
evaluate these types of defense mechanisms. They showed
that the false gradients cannot protect the network when the
attack uses the gradients which are the expectation over a
series of transformations.
Since our Learn2Perturb algorithm and other compet-
ing methods involve randomization, the tested algorithms
in this study are evaluated via the EOT attack method as
well. To do so, followed by [30], at every iteration of PGD
attack, the gradient is achieved as the expectation calculated
from a Monte Carlo method with 80 simulations of differ-
ent transformations. Results show that the network trained
via PNI can provide 48.65% robustness compared to Adv-
BNN which provides 51.19% robustness for the CIFAR-10
dataset against this attack. Experimental result illustrates
that the proposed Learn2Perturb approach can produce a
model which achieves 53.34% robustness and outperforms
the other two state-of-the-art algorithms.
It is worth mentioning that the experimental results
showed that neither the proposed Learn2Perturb method
nor the other competing approaches studied in this work
suffer from obfuscated gradients. Furthermore, the pro-
posed Learn2Perturb method successfully passes the five
metrics introduced in [3], and thus further illustrates that
Learn2Perturb is not subjected to obfuscated gradients.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed Learn2Perturb, an end-to-
end feature perturbation learning approach for improving
adversarial robustness of deep neural networks. Learned
perturbation injection modules are introduced to increase
uncertainty during both training and inference to make it
harder to craft successful adversarial attacks. A novel al-
ternating back-propagation approach is also introduced to
learn both network parameters and perturbation-injection
module parameters in an alternating fashion. Experimental
results on both different black-box and white-box attacks
demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed Learn2Perturb
algorithm, which outperformed the state-of-the-art meth-
ods in improving robustness against different adversarial
attacks. Future work involves exploring extending the pro-
posed modules to inject a greater perturbation type diversity
for greater generalization in terms of adversarial robustness.
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Supplementary Material
A. Detailed Analysis
Here we provide a more detailed analysis of the experi-
ments evaluating the proposed method and other tested al-
gorithmswith regards to their theoretical background, train-
ing, and evaluation.
A.1. Embedding perturbation-injection modules in
a network
Generally perturbation-injectionmodules can be embed-
ded after the activation of each layer. However, for the
ResNet baselines we choose to add them just to the output
of every block and before the ReLU activation. We do this
to reduce the amount of trainable parameters and reduce the
training and inference times. Nevertheless, any other setup
can be used as well.
A.2. Behaviour of noise distributions in PNI vs
Learn2Perturb
As stated in Section 3.2, the trained noise parameters by
the PNI approach fluctuate during the training because of
the loss function. The min-max optimization applied in that
methodology causes the training to enforce noise parame-
ters to be zero as the number of training epoch increases.
As such, it is crucial to select the right number of epochs in
the training step.
This issue has been addressed in the proposed
Learn2Perturb algorithm by introducing a new regulariza-
tion term in the loss function. As a result, there is a trade-
off between training proper perturbation-injection distribu-
tion and modeling accuracy during the training step. This
trade-off would let the perturbation modules to learn prop-
erly and eventually converge to a steady state. To this end,
a harmonic series term is introduced in the proposed regu-
larization term which decreases the effect of regularization
as the number of training epochs increases, and help the
perturbation-injection modules to converge.
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of noise distributions in
both PNI and Learn2Perturb algorithm during the training.
As seen, the proposed Learn2Perturb algorithm can handle
the noise distributions properly and as a result, the noise
distribution parameters are being trained as the number of
training epoch increases until they converge to a steady
state. However, the noise distributions are forced to zero
for the model trained via the PNI algorithm due to the way
the loss function is formulated.
A.3. Theoretical Background
It has been illustrated by Pinot et al. [30] that random-
izing a deep neural network can improve the robustness of
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Figure 4. Evolution of mean over noise perturbation parameters
through training epochs for ResNet V2. As seen, while the noise
distributions are growing the in the Learn2Perturb algorithm, they
converge close to zero in the PNI method.
the model against adversarial attacks. A deep neural net-
work M is a probabilistic mapping when it maps X to Y
via M : X −→ P (Y); to obtain a numerical output of this
probabilistic mapping, one needs to sample y according to
M(x).
The probabilistic mapping M(x) is dP (Y )(α, ǫ, γ)
robust if PC-Riskǫ(M, ǫ) ≤ γ, where PC-Riskǫ(M, ǫ)
is defined as the minimum value of τ when
dP (Y )
(
M(x+ t),M(x)
)
> ǫ and dP (Y )(·) is a met-
ric/divergence on p(Y). If M(x) follows an Exponential
family distribution, it is possible to define the upper bound
for the robustness of the model based on ǫ-perturbation.
A.4. Detailed Experimental Setup
In order to encourage the reproducible experimental re-
sults, in this section we provide a detailed explanation of
the experimental setup and environment of the reported ex-
periments. Pytorch version 1.2 was used for developing all
experiments, and our codes will be open sourced upon the
acceptance of this paper.
Following the observation made by Madry et al. [24], ca-
pacity of networks alone can help increasing the robustness
of the models against adversarial attacks. As such, we com-
pare Learn2Perturb and competing state-of-the-art methods
for various networks with different capacities.
The ResNet [13] architectures has been selected as the
baseline network followed by the state-of-the-art methods
and the fast convergence property of this network. The
effect of network depth were evaluated by examining the
competing methods via ResNet-V1(32), (44), (56) as well
as ResNet-V1(20) where (x) shows the depth of the net-
work. Moreover, the effect of network width is exam-
ined similar to the work done by Zagoruyko and Ko-
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modakis [36]. To increase the width of the network (i.e,
experiment performed on ResNet-V1(20)), the number of
input and output channels of each layer is increased by a
constant multiplier, ×1.5, ×2, and ×4 which widen the
ResNet architecture. However we do not follow the exact
approach of [36] in which they applied dropout layers in
the network; instead we just increase the width of the ba-
sic convolution at each layer by increasing the number of
input/output channels.
We also consider a ResNet-V2(18), which has a very
large capacity compared to ResNet-V1 architecture. Not
only the number of channels have increased in this archi-
tecture but also it uses 1 × 1 convolutions to perform the
down-sampling at each residual blocks.
The proposed Learn2Perturb, No defence, and Vanilla
methods, used the same setup for gradient descent opti-
mizer. SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 with Nes-
terovmomentum and weight decay of 1e−4 is used for train-
ing of those methods. The noise injection parameters have
weight decay equal to 0. We use the batch size of 128, and
350 epochs to train the model. The initial learning rate is
0.1, then changes to 0.01 and 0.001 at epochs 150 and 250,
respectively.
For the parameter γ in equation (7), we choose value
10−4 for all of our experiments. In equation 8, we have τ
which as we state is the output of a harmonic series given
the epoch number. we formulate tau as below:
τ(t) =
t∑
i=s
1
i− s− 1
(9)
where t shows the current epoch, while s shows the first
epoch number from which noise is being added to the net-
work.
For training models with PNI, the same parameters re-
ported by authors [14] are used.
The PGD adversarial training utilized alongside with
the alternative back-propagation technique in the proposed
method which can be formulated as:
arg min
W,θ
[
arg max
δ∈l∞−ǫ
L
(
P (X + δ;W, θ), T
)]
(10)
whereW encodes the network parameters and θ shows the
perturbation-injection parameters. In this formulation only
adversarially generated samples are used in the training step
for the outer minimization, following the original work in-
troduced in [24].
Finally, in order to balance between the adversarial ro-
bustness and clean data accuracy [14, 37], we formulate the
adversarial training as follow:
arg min
W,θ
[
α · L
(
P (X ;W, θ), T
)
+
β · arg max
δ∈l∞−ǫ
L
(
P (X + δ;W, θ), T
)]
(11)
where the first term shows the loss associated to the clean
data and α is the weight for the clean data loss term, while
the second shows the loss associated with the adversarially
generated data with weight β. The models trained with the
proposed Learn2Perturb algorithm use α = β = 0.5. (11)
helps gain adversarial robustness, while maintaining a rea-
sonably high clean data accuracy.
A.5. Black-Box Attacks
In this section, the robustness of the proposed method
and the competing algorithms against black-box attacks are
evaluated. Two different attacks including few-pixel at-
tack [32] and transferability attack [27] are used to evaluate
the competing methods.
Few-pixel attack (here in the range of one to three pixels)
utilizes differential evolution technique to fool deep neural
networks under the extreme limitation of only altering at
most few pixels. We use population size of 400 and max-
imum iteration steps of 75 for the differential evolution al-
gorithm. The attack strength is controlled by the number of
pixels that are allowed to be modified. In this comparison
we consider the {1,2,3}-pixel attacks.
Table 5 shows the comparison results of the competing
methods against few-pixel attack. Two different network ar-
chitectures (ResNet-V1(20) and ResNet-v2(18)) are used to
evaluate the competing algorithms. As seen, the proposed
Learn2Perturb method outperforms other state-of-the-art
methods when the baseline network architecture is ResNet-
V1(20). However, Adv-BNN provides better performance
when the baseline network architectures is ResNet-V2(18),
while the proposed Learn2Perturb algorithm provides com-
parable performance for this baseline.
Table 6 demonstrates the comparison results for the pro-
posed Learn2Perturb and state-of-the-art methods based on
Transferability attack. Results again show that the proposed
Learn2Perturb method provides robust prediction against
this attack as well.
A.6. CIFAR-100
A more detailed analysis of the experimental setup and
results for the CIFAR-100 dataset is provided as follows.
The CIFAR-100 dataset [18] is very similar to CIFAR-10
dataset, however the image samples are categorized to 100
fine class labels. All the models involving PGD adversarial
training are trained with ǫ = 8255 during training. Figures 5
and 6 demonstrate the performance comparison of the pro-
posed Learn2Perturb with other state-of-the-art methods on
CIFAR-100 dataset based on FGSM and PGD attacks.
As seen, the proposed Learn2Perturb method outper-
forms other competing algorithms for ǫs up to 8255 , how-
ever for bigger ǫs it provides comparable performance with
Adv-BNN, which has the best result.
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Table 5. Few-pixel attack; the competing methods are evaluated via few-pixel [32] attack base on two network architectures of ResNet-
V1(20) and ResNet-V2(18). {1,2,3} pixels are changed in the test samples to perturbed the images.
Network Architecture Attack Strength No defence Vanilla PNI Adv-BNN Learn2Perturb
ResNet-V1(20)
1-pixel 21.45 65.20 67.40 58.40 70.15
2-pixel 2.55 48.35 61.75 56.20 63.90
3-pixel 1.10 36.40 58.10 55.70 61.85
ResNet-V2(18)
1-pixel 23.44 56.10 50.90 68.60 64.45
2-pixel 3.20 33.20 39.00 64.55 60.05
3-pixel 0.95 23.95 35.40 59.70 53.90
Table 6. Transferability attack comparison. The competing methods are attacked within the context of Transferability where the perturbed
images utilized to evaluate the robustness of the model are generated by one another method. The ‘Source Model’ is the model which the
perturbed samples are generated from to attack each competing algorithm.
Vanilla PNI Adv-BNN Learn2Perturb
Network Architecture Source Model FGSM PGD FGSM PGD FGSM PGD FGSM PGD
Resnet20 - V1
Vanilla – – 60.32±0.05 58.27±0.01 49.22±0.90 48.63±3.10 58.86±0.03 56.75 ± 0.01
PNI 66.31±0.02 63.04±0.01 – – 51.12±1.22 49.59±0.83 63.26±0.10 59.31 ± 0.06
Adv-BNN 74.38±0.16 72.02±0.02 73.05±0.12 70.26±0.05 – – 72.48±0.05 69.25 ± 0.06
Learn2Perturb 70.66±0.01 67.32±0.01 68.46±0.03 64.77±0.01 54.16±2.36 52.23±1.52 – –
Resnet18 - V2
Vanilla – – 69.52±0.02 68.01±0.02 67.20±0.04 65.88±0.03 67.32±0.04 65.58 ± 0.04
PNI 69.56±0.01 67.09±0.02 – – 67.63±0.03 64.87±0.04 67.63±0.05 64.61 ± 0.01
Adv-BNN 73.66±0.01 71.23±0.01 74.02±0.03 71.51±0.02 – – 71.67±0.09 68.75 ± 0.04
Learn2Perturb 73.49±0.01 70.44±0.00 73.89±0.04 70.61±0.01 70.22±0.04 67.33±0.04 – –
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Figure 5. FGSM attack on CIFAR-100 with different epsilons for
the l∞ ball on ResNet-V2(18).
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Figure 6. PGD attack on CIFAR-100 with different epsilons for
the l∞ ball on ResNet-V2(18).
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